

ІСТОРІЯ І ТЕОРІЯ ФІЛОСОФІЇ

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PSYCHOLOGISM AS A HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL PHENOMENON

Abstract. *Introduction.* The end of the XXth – the beginning of the XXIth century brought a brand new essence to the problem of psychologism. The studies in logic, philosophy of consciousness, cognitive sciences came to focus on “new psychologism”, “metapsychologism”, and other similar trends which seem to overcome the so-called insuperable barrier between logic and psychology, drawn by antipsychologism on the edge of the XIX–XXth centuries. *Purpose.* The aim of the research is establishing the conceptual unity and the variety of historical forms of psychologism in the European philosophy of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries. *Methods.* The research is based on the systemic, historical, phenomenological, dialectic, hermeneutical methods as well as on the comparative method, providing the comparison of different forms of psychologism and the XIXth and XXth century philosophers’ points of view on the problem. *Results.* Philosophical psychologism appears a broader phenomenon than “psychologism in logic”, related to the general tendencies in the development of philosophy and having general philosophical basis. Its development in the XIXth century correlates with the processes of empirical psychology development and psychology becoming a separate science along with sometimes painful and sharp parting from philosophy. From this perspective, philosophical psychologism can be regarded as the tendency for grounding all the philosophical problems as well as other Humanities with the help of notions and methods of psychology as a positive science. *Originality.* The scientific novelty of the research lies in an attempt to represent philosophical psychologism as complex multisided historical-philosophical and cultural-historical phenomenon, playing an ambivalent role in the XIXth century philosophy, having the features of some kind of “one-side – illness” as well as of possible grounding for new philosophical trends. *Conclusion.* Speaking about the historical-philosophical context of the problem of psychologism that emerged in the European (and home) philosophy of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries, we should emphasize that psychologism had various, sometimes rather different forms, which cannot receive definite estimation from the perspective of the further experience of the philosophical development. Having emerged on the edge of philosophy and psychology, psychologism could be referred to as both a painful reduction of philosophy to psychology and a creative enrichment of philosophy with the achievements of psychology. We claim that such a multidimensional image of psychologism reflects the historico-philosophical realia of the time under study more adequately, and thus it should help to approach, without superstitions, the modern fluctuations of psychologism that emerged on the edge of philosophy, psychology and cognitive-information sciences.

Key words: philosophical psychologism, anti-psychologism, rationalism, associationism, psychophysical parallelism, empirical psychology, voluntarism, “new psychologism”.

Formulation of the problem. The end of the XXth – the beginning of the XXIth century brought a brand new essence to the problem of psychologism. The studies in logic, philosophy of consciousness, cognitive sciences came to focus on “new psychologism”, “metapsychologism”, and other similar trends which seem to overcome the so-called insuperable barrier between logic and psychology, drawn by antipsychologism on the edge of the XIX–XXth centuries. The above mentioned new forms of psychologism correlate, first of all, with the researches in the sphere of artificial intelligence development, intellectual cooperation modeling, game theory and other contemporary trends proving that the ways of correlation between logic and human cognition practice appear much richer in variety than it was suggested by the traditional descriptive view.

The overlap between logic and empirical cognitive sciences is fruitful for both and provides the forming of “a deeper logic conception” [1].

At the same time the above mentioned changes serve as the basis for a new perspective on the historico-philosophical material labeled as “psychologism”. Since the times of the antipsychological criticism, this title has acquired a negative shade of estimation, has been treated as a scientific disease or an unpleasant problem that needs overcoming. This approach has become a historico-philosophical stamp having unfavourable effects on any unbiased research on the relevant historico-philosophical plots. Meanwhile, the discussion has referred not to some unimportant historic-philosophical episode; on the contrary, psychologism has reflected a rather broad tendency, and the “discussion on psychologism” emerging on the edge of the XIX–XXth centuries proves its importance. This discussion, and the historico-philosophical stereotype of the negative attitude to the phenomenon, resulted in either complete excluding from the historico-philosophical process some outstanding philosophers having a leading role in the philosophy of the XIXth century as well as in its further development, or reducing their role and influence on the bed of Procrustes of the antipsychological approach. We mean here J. Gerbart, J. Fries, F. Beneke, M. de Biran, G. Fechner, W. Wundt, A. Bain, Ch. Sigwart and others. The role of other famous scientists – J. S. Mill, W. Dilthey, W. James, E. Mach – needs reinterpreting as well as the antipsychological criticism itself, esp. Frege and Husserl’s approach.

Analysis of the recent research and publications. The topicality of the research lies in the insufficient elaboration of the given topic. Appealing to the works dealing with the problem of psychologism at the end of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries, one should bear in mind that their authors were, as a rule, involved in that discussion, thus, their ideas and perspectives may appear not objective enough. Whereas the modern researches into the phenomenon of psychologism aren’t numerous, and not all of them are historico-philosophical, namely, the works of M. Kusch, M. Rath, M. Notturmo, S. Haack, H. Sorina. For instance, M. Kusch deals with the problem of psychologism from the philosophy of knowledge perspective [2; 3]; S. Haack – from the philosophy of logic perspective [4]; H. Sorina investigates the dilemma of “psychologism - antipsychologism” as the example of a logical-cultural dominant [5]; M. Notturmo refers to the consequences of the antipsychological criticism manifested in logical positivism [6]; M. Rath deals with the discussion on psychologism within German philosophy [7] being undoubtedly the most important but not the only one from the European perspective on this phenomenon.

Purpose. The aim of the research is establishing the conceptual unity and the variety of historical forms of psychologism in the European philosophy of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries.

Presenting the main material. It should be taken into account that the problem of psychologism in the XIXth century appeared on the background of difficult processes of differentiating philosophy from other Arts, first of all, psychology, thus raising the issue of the nature and content of philosophical knowledge, of the correlation between philosophy and science, philosophy and religion, and other methodological philosophical and scientific problems. These processes were influenced by the situation of a deep crisis in philosophy at the end of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries. That is why, an objective research into the phenomenon of the European psychologism has not only a certain historico-philosophical significance, but presents a methodological research, connected with the perception of the general essence of philosophy in social and human life, its role in the scientific cognition and the world view formation.

The phenomenon of the European psychologism doesn’t refer to separate countries, namely, Germany, France, or England. The corresponding tendency of philosophical thinking, as well as the corresponding reaction to this tendency, reveals itself in the whole European (or, in its broader sense, – Western) philosophical space. In particular, a lot of thinkers taking the direct part in solving the dilemma of “psychologism – antipsychologism” can be found among the philosophers working during the second half of the XIXth century in Ukraine, namely, N. Grot, G. Chelpanov, V. Zenkovsky, some representatives of Lviv–Warsaw School and others.

A very interesting idea in this context appears in V. Chernyshov's conception differentiating H. Skovoroda's psychologism and aestheticism as the two sides of his world view, connected with the influence of Eastern Christianity and Western Christianity, the psychologism being the manifestation of precisely Western Christianity starting with Augustine's philosophy [8].

The historico-philosophical analysis of psychologism in the European philosophy of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries shows that we are dealing with a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. Its estimation should be complex as well, at least, nowadays, after a hundred years since the thunderlike antipsychologistic invectives have appeared in E. Husserl's "Philosophy as Strict Science" [9] this estimation should be more considerate. The XXth century can be referred to as the age of antipsychologism. The thesis about logic being autonomous and independent from other sciences dealing with thinking, especially from psychology, has become primary in the researches on symbolic logic. Antipsychologism gained a victory in a difficult argument at the end of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth century. A lot of time has passed since that period and there appeared an urgent need to estimate the results of the polemics and to attempt outlining the prospects of the psychologism problem solving from the perspective of contemporary level of logic and philosophy development.

Obviously, one should differentiate between the philosophical psychologism itself (we mean psychologisation of philosophy in general and of its separate constituents including logic) and psychologism in separate sciences, for example, in history, sociology, law, literature studies etc (and even in psychology itself). All these phenomena could be united under the conventional name "the world of psychologism" as a historico-cultural phenomenon (the term coined by H. Sorina [5]) with the assertion that the psychologisation of separate sciences has roots in the psychologisation of the philosophical bases of these sciences. At the same time one should consider the variety and a complex nature of the "world".

Within philosophy itself we should differentiate between the phenomenon of philosophical psychologism and philosophical psychology as a branch of philosophical knowledge. Philosophical psychology as a rational (metaphysical) study of soul is not by itself a manifestation of psychologism. Psychologism emerges when philosophical psychology turns into the metaphysical teaching on "the world's soul", panpsychism etc; when the empirization of metaphysical psychology happens, its integration into the structure of deterministic ideas of natural sciences leading to the separation of empirical psychology as a natural science with its philosophical features preserved.

Firstly, philosophical psychologism stands out as the focus of philosophical analysis on the investigations into the mechanisms of human cognition with the recognition of the world's being beyond the grasp of the mind. It leads to the assertion that inner experience is the only possible source of knowledge. This psychologism can have other names: introspective empirism or subjectivized (psychologized) gnoseologism. This trend can be clearly traced in the English philosophy starting from J. Locke, D. Hume, J. Berkeley, though the starting point here is R. Descartes' *cogito*. This approach was further developed in J. Mill's empirical logic, empiriocritical program of the second positivism (E. Mach and R. Avenarius), W. James's radical empirism of mystical experience.

Secondly, philosophical psychologism, based in its rationalistic version on Descartes' ideas, is connected with psychophysical dualism, acquiring religious-metaphysical form in Malebranche's occasionalism and Leibniz's conception of predefined harmony, and soon turns into the theory of psychophysical parallelism. The above mentioned dualism contributed to rendering the sphere of psyche as a separate subject of investigation, and to the development of rational and empirical psychologies as the parts of philosophical system (Ch. Wolff), and later to the institutionalization of psychology, namely empirical psychology, that rejected "the God hypothesis", accepted the idea of parallel existence of psychical and physical phenomena as a metaphysical postulate and focused on investigations of the former, not taking into account the cause and effect relationship between the former and the latter. The psychic sphere, thus, turns into a separate subject of investigation of a separate study – psychology referring to itself as to the main philosophical science (W. Wundt). This rationalistic approach characterized by the intention to create *mathesis universalis* can be

traced in both theoretical (J. Herbart) and experimental (G. Fechner) attempts at mathematization of psychology, besides they were all the more accompanied by peculiar metaphysical researches.

Thirdly, the materialistic version of Cartesian philosophy, which has turned into rather direct versions of the Enlightenment materialism in the course of time, in connection with materialistic sensualism (E. Condillac) and materialistic associanism (D. Hartley) contributed to the development of considerable (if compared to Descartes' treating the pineal gland) physiological investigations. Following the spirit of time, physiology developed, first of all, as biologised physics, and in the course of time having got certain philosophical "injections", namely from Kantianism (M. Müller), of psychophysics (G. Fechner) and psychophysiology (W. Helmholtz), started claiming to be the only scientific psychology capable of substituting philosophy because of its uselessness and helplessness with natural scientific investigations into human nervous-psychological activity. A "science" phrenology has become an exotic branch of such materialistic psychologism.

Fourthly, Kant's "Copernican revolution" corrected, to a great extent, the development of all the above mentioned tendencies. It is Kant who can be called the father of the European philosophical psychologism of the XIXth century, though the responsibility should lie with his followers rather than him. Kant's philosophy is ambivalent if speaking about logical as well as psychological bases for the process of cognition, but this ambivalence becomes clear on the background of peculiar transcendence of consciousness onto the outer world, including this world into the structures being constituted by transcendental apperception; and this provides additional grounds for the subjectivist and psychological understanding of the conditions of cognition potentialities. In particular, the psychologisation of Kantianism is realized in Fries and Beneke's empirical metaphysics trying to prove the theory of cognition with the help of empirical psychology; actually their philosophy obtains the name "psychologism".

Fifthly, along with the theoretical-cognitive and empirical-physiological forms of positivism, the so-called activity psychologism is being developed. The first two focus on ideas and feelings correspondingly, seeing mostly the passive aspect of the psychical sphere, whereas focusing on the will as the third part of spiritual life underlines its active nature. Voluntarisation of psychology in the XIXth century (we can find a more philosophical variant of such voluntarised psychology in W. Wundt) had its philosophical roots in Fichte and Schopenhauer's ideas, and ontologisation of will in philosophy itself acquires "dangerous" characteristics in Nietzsche's antimetaphysical superpsychologism. On the other hand, the actualization of will source contributes to the increase in attention to the subconscious side of human psyche (actually, not only human; the margin is drawn here between Leibniz's discovery of the universal character of cognitive activity in the form of unconscious perception and further variations of panpsychism).

Sixthly, the combination of the activity approach to voluntarism, inherent in the philosophy of life, with the idea of proving a different from natural-scientific methodology of "soul science" leads to the development of the philosophical-psychological variant of this methodology (W. Dilthey). We mean that where a human being acts, s/he acts according to the laws of psychology (the same with the groups of people, these are the roots of social psychology and Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie*), that is why all the historical, sociological, cultural and other events are determined by the laws of psychological activity or depend on them. As a result these historical and other events appear to depend not only on the psychology of the participants, but on the psychology of their interpreters – thus, sciences tend to stick to hermeneutics, which may later, in the XXth century, change into the direct deconstructivism due to the linguistic-pragmatical turn.

The spheres of human activities include science as well as cognitive activity which, even having to submit to the laws of correct thinking, depends on the unique features of personal psyche. Thus, seventhly, the psychologisation of logic takes place, both – the logic of scientific research (J. Mill, A. Bain, Ch. Sigwart, N. Grot) and formal logic along with mathematics (F. Brentano, E. Husserl). Still, the psychologisation of history, sociology and law could be treated only as one possible version of the methodological bases of these sciences having the right to exist along with other methodologies (due to the insufficient formalization and the "scientific character" of these

disciplines so far tolerating the coexistence of different “truths”), whereas the psychologisation of the logic of science and the logic of mathematics interfered into the sphere of the most formalized, rationalized, “strictly scientific” knowledge presented as absolutely alien to psychological empirism. That is why, psychologism in logic provoked the determinant rejection of antipsychologism as the direction demanding to exclude any implications of the psychological analysis from the logical-philosophical analysis.

Antipsychological criticism and the charge of psychologism, combined with the charges of relativism, naturalism, skepticism, subjectivism, reductionism and other “sins” alike, were sure to have sense against the strictness of philosophy as a science (F. Frege, E. Husserl). Though, they seemed to be (and they, actually, were) absolute and undeniable only within the scientization of philosophical knowledge, symbolization and mathematization of logic. The treatments of philosophy as the theory of cognition (neo-kantianism) or as the world view (W. Dilthey), or as the analysis of existence, or, for instance, as the root for the national idea were deliberately connected with certain elements or constituents of the psychological analysis of consciousness – the individual, collective or transcendental ones. Finally, Husserl’s phenomenology as a theory of pure *consciousness* couldn’t avoid, at least, formal elements of the psychological connotations, especially in the later topics of intersubjectivity and “world of life”.

In other words, the victory of antipsychologism over the extreme psychologism had as the opposite result the assumption that philosophy as a special form of knowledge and world perception, *containing* rational scientism but not *reducing* to it, cannot include the categorical antipsychologism. Accordingly, the emergence of the issues of philosophical psychology, philosophy of consciousness and philosophy of subconscious as well as philosophic-psychological bases of certain Arts as the forms of “psychologisation” of philosophy cannot be considered psychologism in its negative meaning. The negative estimation can appear only, when philosophical, or social, or empirical (for instance, psychoanalytical or neurophysiological) psychology starts claiming to substitute philosophy, or the general scientific methodology, or, at least, to perform the role of the most important and the most avant-garde and decisive scientific trend.

Conclusion. In the second half of the XXth century psychologism has already acquired new forms and appears to be connected with the truly avant-garde trends of science, namely, with the development of the informational and computational technologies. The possibility of modeling some analogies of human cognitive activity on the electronic-calculating machines, turning in the course of time into the ambitious program of creating the artificial intelligence, soon met the invincible obstacles, generated by the direct usage of the logical calculations (classical logic of the first level predicates). The turn to the more complex logical schemes – actually, from the logic of concepts and assumptions to the logic of images (frames) as well as the direct development of the various non-classical logics and the development of analytical philosophy in the direction of a new philosophy of consciousness – all these factors create the situation of “a new psychologism” and even provoke the appearance of the program of the creation of metapsychologism (V. Bryushynkin) [10]. “A new psychologism” is referred to as the theory of logical procedures considering these procedures the models of the natural thinking, but it could be possible only in case that we admit a certain dependence of the means of construing the logical procedures on the processes of the natural thinking used by a person; and metapsychologism is projected as a technology of the modeling of the structures and processes of the natural thinking, connected with the consideration and argumentation, with the help of the structures and processes appearing on the meta-level of the logical systems. Anyway, this approach presupposes the overcoming of the categorical opposition of psychologism and antipsychologism, of logic and psychology, suggesting new horizons for the philosophical comprehension of consciousness and existence.

Speaking about the historico-philosophical context of the problem of psychologism that emerged in the European (and home) philosophy of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries, we should emphasize that psychologism had various, sometimes rather different forms, which cannot receive definite estimation from the perspective of the further experience of the

philosophical development. Having emerged on the edge of philosophy and psychology, psychologism could be referred to as both a painful reduction of philosophy to psychology and a creative enrichment of philosophy with the achievements of psychology.

We claim that such a multidimensional image of psychologism reflects the historico-philosophical realia of the time under study more adequately, and thus it should help without superstitions to approach the modern fluctuations of psychologism that emerged on the edge of philosophy, psychology and cognitive-information sciences.

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ПСИХОЛОГІЗМ ЯК ІСТОРИКО-ФІЛОСОФСЬКИЙ ФЕНОМЕН

Стаття присвячена історико-філософському аналізу філософського психологізму як багатогранного історико-філософського та культурно-історичного феномену, який відіграв неоднозначну роль у філософії XIX століття, маючи ознаки як своєрідної хвороби однобічності, так

і перспективного обґрунтування нових філософських напрямків. Показані його витoki, що формувалися в метафізиці та філософській психології Нового часу. Узагальнюються основні напрямки та різновиди філософського психологізму XIX – початку XX століття. Загалом психологізм постає як намагання піднести психологію на щабель основної, визначальної філософської дисципліни з подальшим її перетворенням на метанауку, що виступає у ролі загальної методології соціально-гуманітарних наук і робить взагалі непотрібною філософію. Одночасно показано, що під загальною назвою психологізму можуть приховуватися досить різні тенденції – як хвороблива редукція філософії до психології, так і творче збагачення філософії здобутками психології, що вимагає певного переосмислення категоричності антипсихологістської критики. Прослідковується зв'язок між тенденціями філософського психологізму минулого і сучасними перспективами когнітивних наук, зокрема, у контексті «нового психологізму».

Ключові слова: філософський психологізм, антипсихологізм, раціоналізм, асоціанізм, психофізичний паралелізм, емпірична психологія, волюнтаризм, «новий психологізм».

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ДІАЛЕКТИЧНА ЛОГІКА ЯК УМОВА ІСНУВАННЯ ІСТОРІЇ ФІЛОСОФІЇ

У статті досліджується проблема можливості існування історії філософії як теоретичної дисципліни. Зазначається, що заперечення можливості побудови діалектичної логіки як необхідної умови існування історії філософії, її теоретичної і методологічної основи є одночасно і запереченням можливості існування самої історії філософії. Тому основним завданням статті є обґрунтування модифікованої версії діалектики у вигляді функціональної діалектики. Наукова новизна результатів дослідження полягає у розробці функціональної діалектики як методології теорії історії філософії, а також у можливості порівняння функціональної діалектики як версії формалізованої діалектики із теоріями сучасної символічної логіки, започаткуванні діалогу між ними. У статті відстоюється думка, що історія філософії як теоретична дисципліна можлива за умови існування діалектичної логіки як системи філософської логіки. Саме тому викладання функціональної діалектики як формалізованої діалектичної логіки повинно передувати викладанню історії філософії як теоретичної дисципліни.

Ключові слова: діалектична логіка, функціональна діалектика, філософська логіка, формалізована діалектична логіка, історія філософії.

Постановка проблеми. Теоретичною і методологічною основою історії філософії як становлення мови філософії є діалектична логіка. Мова філософії і діалектична логіка нерозривно пов'язані між собою. Цей факт зафіксований у принципі єдності історичного і логічного. Історія філософії є історією становлення мови філософії як поняттєвої системи, а діалектична логіка – концептуалізацією історії філософії як теоретичної дисципліни. Метафізична, трансцендентальна, феноменологічна логіки дають змогу в процесі предикації приписувати тільки один предикат і лише діалектична логіка припускає можливість приписування двох протилежних предикатів одночасно, і як наслідок можливість існування історії філософії у вигляді мікроісторії філософії як