

SUMMARY

A collection of the essays written by Ivan Monolatii is focused on the understudied and disputable aspects of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1914–1923, mainly on how Western Ukrainian statehood was established and developed in 1918–1919, as well as some specific issues of the political history of the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) in 1918–1923. By applying the theories of randomness introduced by scientists in the 20th – early 21st centuries, the author puts forward an approach to the events of the early 20th century Ukrainian history, which is completely different to what has been suggested before.

Keywords: Ukrainian Revolution; Black Swan theory; Gray Rhino theory; typologies of elites by Niccolò Machiavelli, Max Weber, Isaiah Berlin, Vyacheslav Lypynsky; group selection by Konrad Lorenz, the origin of the neuroses by Sigmund Freud; Butterfly effect; Western Ukrainian National Republic, Galicia, Ukraine.

In his first essay *Black Swans of the Ukrainian Revolution. (Im)probable cases of the Western Ukrainian Statehood*, building up on the theory of Black Swans developed by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a Lebanese-American mathematician, Ivan Monolatii comes up with the three research hypotheses related to the events that took place in Galicia in 1918–1919.

The first hypothesis studies the November Uprising as the Black Swan of Western Ukrainian statehood. The second deals with the events of 3 January 1919 when the

Ukrainian National Rada (Council) approved the union of the ZUNR and the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) that in the author's opinion is an example of the Black Swan because its (non-)implementation had far more grave consequences than its contemporaries thought it would. The third theory analyses another Black Swan, which is the nomination of Yevhen Petrushevych as a dictator on 9 June 1919 that led to the return to the ZUNR legal framework and the pursuit of the independent 'Galician state'.

Each of Monolatii's hypotheses can be encapsulated, as follows:

1. The first hypothesis demonstrates that the November Uprising of 31 October – 1 November 1918 testifies not only to Taleb's transition from Mediocristan that is the Habsburg Empire, a tyranny of the collective, to Extremistan represented by the ZUNR, a tyranny of the accidental, but also to the Black Swan event that had epochal consequences for the studied region. Motolatiy is certain, the November Uprising became the Black Swan not only for Galicia Ukrainians (to some extent, though) but also for 'strangers', first of all for Poles and Jews residing in Galicia. On the other hand, the November Uprising, as the Black Swan, sparked a new warfare (after World War I) first for Lviv and then for Galicia. Therefore, this situation just aggravates the Black Swan problem as an (im)probable event of Western Ukrainian statehood in 1918-1919.

2. The second hypothesis indicates that the ZUNR being Extremistan after the November Uprising (1 November 1918) suffered from the Black Swan. Experience of the past did not help regional political actors to foresee the future including the one for Galicia and for the ZUNR. The tyranny of the accidental that was the emotionally tinged decision of the Ukrainian National Rada on 3 January 1919, happened again, and

the winner, the Ukrainian National Rada, took all it aspired to, i.e. joining the Ukrainian National Rada. The history started 'jumping' again – this time after 22 January 1919. However, keeping Taleb's contemplations in mind, the second Black Swan is more likely to be nearly-Black or Gray given the fact that its occurrence was foreseen first by external and then by internal political actors after December 1918. They were ready to that happening which eventually took place on 3 January 1919, and the Preliminary Agreement being signed in Fastiv worked as a suitable tool. Therefore, the 'Stanislav' decision on the union of the ZUNR and the UNR is in its essence *the Mandelbrotian randomness*, and the author suggests the category of 'sobornist' (national unity) to be treated as *fractal*.

3. The third hypothesis proves, the introduction of Dictatorship on 9 June 1919, indirectly though, in a certain way led to the change of Galicia's status on the geo-political chessboard of Europe. This new status got embodied through a 'cascade' of events:

1) the decision of the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conference on 25 June 1919 to allow Poland to take over Galicia;

2) the Treaty of Warsaw (Petliura-Piisudski Agreement) of 1920 under which Eastern Galicia, among other lands, was ceded to Poland;

3) the Treaty of Riga of 1921 which de facto abrogated the Treaty of Warsaw, whereas UkSSR renounced its claims to Eastern Galicia by handing it over to II Rzeczpospolita;

4) by its decision of 15 March 1923, the Conference of Ambassadors of the great powers of the Entente recognized the sovereignty of Poland with Eastern Galicia being part of its territory.

In the conclusions to this essay Monolatii emphasizes that under Taleb's theory, the Black Swans of the

Ukrainian revolution scaled down to Western Ukraine could be assigned to the respective quadrants: the first Black Swan (the November Uprising) to the Fourth Quadrant of the *positive* Black Swan, the third Swan (Dictatorship of the Western Province of the UNR – ZOUNR) also to the Fourth Quadrant but of the *negative* Black Swan. Though, the second Black Swan or the first and the only Gray Swan (Ukrainian National Rada's decision on the union) is most likely to be in the Third Quadrant which implies simple payoffs, i.e. the probability of this Swan had no impact on the final result (22 January 1919). Hence, they are only the November Uprising and the Dictatorship that fit in the Fourth Quadrant of the Black Swan domain.

To close, the author suggests that the Ukrainian revolution in Galicia did not end in 1923 (when the ZUNR in its emigration format came to the end), but lasted all way till 30 June 1941, when the restoration of the Ukrainian state was proclaimed. This very event is another Black Swan, similar in its 'Black Swan' nature, therefore akin to the November Uprising. Members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (led by Bandera) who proclaimed this restoration in Lviv, 'caught' Nazis by surprise and forced the Nazi regime in the Procrustean bed of the political expediency, fait accompli and the Ukrainian national liberation movement in the time of World War II. Monolatii considers that the happening of 30 June 1941 in Lviv accords with Taleb's logic being an extreme, exclusive and absolutely unexpected event. The Proclamation of Ukrainian statehood on 30 June 1941 became the Black Swan not only for Western Ukrainians (to some extent, though) but also for 'strangers', first of all, for occupying Nazi rulers. However, this Black Swan being an attempt to start a new phase in building the state in the times of the military and political conflict, provoked the

imprisonment of Ukrainian nationalistic leaders and the change of the command of Roland and Nachtigall battalions by Germans. On top of that, it could also have an impact on the killings of Jewish and Polish elites in Lviv in summer 1941, which was instigated by occupying powers. The author suggests the latter to be treated as a payback for 30 June 1941, given the fact that in Lviv the occupying powers used the proclamation of the restoration of Ukrainian statehood to their own anti-Semitic and anti-Polish purposes.

In his second essay *Gray Rhinos of the Ukrainian Revolution. Probable Threats for Western-Ukrainian statehood that were overlooked* based on the Gray Rhino theory by American strategist Michele Wucker, the author studies the Treaty of Warsaw (Petliura-Piisudski Agreement) and specifically its impact on Galicia statehood(less). Following Wucker's way of thinking, Monolatii suggests that this Gray Rhino of the Ukrainian Revolution was the outcome of a few factors:

- 'inconvenient truth' – negotiations conducted by the diplomatic missions of the UNR Directory with Poles on the status of Galicia, and how the government of the ZOUNR reacted to those attempts;

- 'Charged Rhino' – the relations between the ZOUNR and the UNR as a results of the Galician Army's retreat across the Zbruch River;

- 'Recurring Rhino' – typhus epidemic in the Galician Army which is akin to 'Domino' and 'Chimera Rhinos' (here again health problems);

- 'Meta-Rhino' – problems of the public administration in the UNR and the ZOUNR related to 'Riddle or Gordian Knot' that are Ukrainian-Polish relations in general, and the Galician theme in particular.

The author justifies his opinion by saying that the nature of the 1920 Treaty of Warsaw, as the Gray Rhino for Western Ukrainians, corresponds to the stages of

how the Gray Rhino reacts to the threat, as suggested by Michelle Wucker – 1) denial, 2) muddling, 3) diagnosing, 4) panic, 5) action (trampling).

Using the term 'l'événement monster' introduced by French scientist Pierre Nora, Monolatii believes that the attack of the Gray Rhino on Western Ukrainian statehood, specifically the Treaty of Warsaw on 21 April 1920, is somewhat the 'monster event' that triggered a few events of the local and regional importance, i.e. the occupation of Galicia by the Soviet armed forces in July 1920, the proclamation of the Galician Soviet Socialist Republic, the Treaty of Riga in 1921 which annulled the Treaty of Warsaw and finally established the line of frontiers with the rule of Poland over the Western Ukrainian lands.

The main idea of this essay is that it was the 1920 Treaty of Warsaw, the Gray Rhino for Galicia that became an inevitable event, which was neglected by Ukrainian politicians in the presence of two key factors. Firstly, de facto Poland conquered the western Ukrainian lands, and by sanctioning the Polish temporary occupation of the region rather than its annexation, the Supreme Council of the Entente made that happen. Furthermore, on 10 September 1919, the Allies signed the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye with Austria as a successor to the Austrian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, and this treaty recorded the right of the Entente for Eastern Galicia, whereas on 2 December 1919, the Paris Peace Conference declined to grant Poland a mandate to temporary rule Eastern Galicia. Secondly, the absence of the legal framework to speak on behalf of the UNR in international affairs (the Constitution of 28 January 1919 not being recognized meant that the UNR itself remained non-recognized) which automatically turned the political and military convention the Treaty of Warsaw into a personal

agreement of two state leaders, i.e. Head of the state (Józef Piłsudski) and Supreme Otaman (Symon Petliura). Hence, in the author's opinion, the 1920 Treaty of Warsaw, as the Gray Rhino for Western Ukrainian statehood, is the end result of its various types, as suggested by Michele Wucker.

Therefore, Monolatii points to a very disheartening situation by saying that Galicia felt very much dissatisfied with the Treaty of Warsaw which subsequently deepened the rupture in the Ukrainian political camp and accelerated the move to running 'Western Ukrainian state politics' independently, with the UNR politicians putting the whole blame on Galicians. He also adds that further undertakings of the Ukrainian political elite in Galicia give evidence of the Gray Rhino effect which Wucker calls 'Creative Destruction' and 'Unidentified Rhino' meaning the situation where the efforts spent are greater than the benefits achieved. Understandably, the ZOUNR diplomatic potency should have been far stronger than in fact, it was at that time.

In the end, the author suggests that some lines of Ukraine's political history before World War II should be viewed as the Gray Rhino. In terms of time and space, the 'nearest' events took place in Carpathian Ukraine. Here we talk about German arguments for the 'Theory of Greater Ukraine', and Ukrainians and Germans getting closer in November-December 1938, attempts to 'Europeanize' the Ukrainian issue in December 1938 – January 1939, Germany's reluctance in February 1939, and up to the situation when in late February the German foreign policy dumped the issues of Carpathian Ukraine. Therefore, the author thinks that the Gray Rhino reached Carpathian Ukraine on 5-11 March 1939 when the Germans abandoned Khust, and twenty-four hours of the Ukrainian independence (on 14-15 March 1939) did not save it from the Gray Rhino trampling.

The third essay *The ZUNR Zoo. How Political Animals Built the Western Ukrainian State* (which gives the title to the present publication) is the largest in terms of its volume and the scope of issues analysed by Monolatii. The author feels driven to study the ‘animal’ world of the Ukrainian political elite in Galicia by how the building of the state rose and fell in the days of the Ukrainian Revolution, by the colourful figures who exuded both splendour and vileness, and by the psychotypes the Ukrainian politics could boast about and feel ashamed of.

Using ideas, theories and typologies developed by Niccolo Machiavelli about Lions and Foxes, by Isaiah Berlin about Foxes and Hedgehogs, group selections for hatchlings, night herons, rats and geese by Konrad Lorenz, or neurotic conditions of Rat Man and Wolf Man by Sigmund Freud, the author studies twelve famous representatives of ‘Galician’ politics. They are Kost Levytsky, Yevhen Petrushevych, Kyrylo Trylovsky, Myron Tarnavsky, Ivan Makukh, Sydir Holubovych, Lonhyn Tsehelsky, Mykhailo Lozynsky, Osyp Nazaruk, Vasyl Paneiko, Dmytro Vitovsky and Yevhen Konovalts.

Noteworthy, the public space was available for political activities of the essay’s characters long before the November Uprising and the proclamation of the ZUNR. Even though the ZUNR future political animals were far from being children, their ‘allegiant’ political culture backfired. Their entering the ZUNR Zoo was more like a game than a mindful decision for the sake of the independent future.

The author provides wide explanations among which he point to ‘stumbling stones’ in studying the ZUNR Zoo. The *first* stone is that most of the future political players do not provide any recollections of their childhood and adolescence. Monolatii is critical about the fact that this

'omission' has been corrected in memoirs written by Kyrylo Trylovsky, Myron Tarnavsky, Ivan Makukh and Osyph Nazaruk when being in their late years, or in life stories about Dmytro Vitovsky and Yevhen Konovalets. The *second* stumbling stone deals with the hierarchy, the ruling characters, and on a whole, the absence of any family or clan of Western Ukrainian politicians prior to the proclamation of the ZUNR. Finally, the *third* stone puts the question whether Western Ukrainian politicians by and large being 'loyal' to the constitutional order of the Habsburg monarch, were ready for their roles.

The author doubts, the November Uprising was unlikely to change the mindset and the values of the political animals who were building the ZUNR Zoo singly and jointly. Before the Uprising of 1 November 1918, Galicians were in the coordinate system of realism and idealism. In autumn 1918, the battle for Galicia as national 'Piedmont', a springboard for unification, for Ukrainians and Poles entered a new, active phase, so Galician Ukrainians, their leaders in particular, suffered from a mix of problems, i.e. corporatism in terms of a social status, professional, financial and property relationship, changes in mindsets and far-left influences, social polarization in the milieu of social and professional groups, and above all the absence of a new political elite. To add to that, human beings are quite complex, and their motives are not that simple, hence, the late-1918 Galician community was prone to a metaphoric unity which was an affinity through ethnic identity, nationality and church membership. The societal organisation could not help but foresee the rivalry for such a scarce resource as power. That being said, the ZUNR Zoo problems started as soon as the competition of individuals become the key goal of their human activities.

The author articulates some short summarizing statements. Firstly, all political animals of the ZUNR Zoo felt less than confident in themselves and/or their endeavours for the benefits of the Ukrainian Revolution. Secondly, almost all characters of this study except army men, were prone to infantilism, a sort of ‘children’s disease’ of Austrian loyalty. Thirdly, the transformation of the roles of political animals happened mainly because of external factors, not due to ideological beliefs and/or value orientations.

As the final comment, the author asserts, the life among animals implies fights, and if the animals are political then their fights are intra-party, and inter-personal interactions which were unlike to take place. For them, being in the imaginary ZUNR Zoo was largely an escape from active politics, then an attempt to use politics, as scarce resource though, for some benefits. The ‘status’ of Galician politicians was formed not only by their psycho-types and capabilities, but also by equality and inequality of such statuses in the system of interrelations between Galicia and Dnipro Ukraine.

Ivan Monolatii comments, the ZUNR Zoo was all men, masculine (say, the Zoo of males), and furthermore, such a mono-sex culture turned out to be the Achilles heel. To add to that, the ZUNR political ‘males’ were of older age, we saw them ‘fading’, therefore ‘le premier sexe’ of Western Ukrainian statehood was likely to be physically and politically impotent given the actual loss of this statehood in 1919.

The ZUNR Zoo can be better understood when using special tables compiled by the author, in particular the table of possible roles played by the political animals in the times of the ZUNR and in the post-ZUNR period. The researcher once again asserts, it is impossible to apply elite ‘pure’ types from European and American

studies to run a ‘pure’ experiment on Ukrainian Revolution actors, specifically in Galicia of 1918–1923.

In his fourth and final essay *Butterfly Effect or Was There Culture of/in the ZUNR-ZOUNR?*, the author applies the Butterfly Effect theory by Edward Lorenz, an American mathematician and meteorologist, and tries to identify specific features of culture in the settings of the ZUNR and the ZOUNR.

Monolatii’s idea is not about finding cultural actors like artists, writers, publishers, theatre and educational workers during this short period of Western Ukrainian statehood (ZUNR and ZOUNR) who created the phenomenon of what the Ukrainian historical science adamantly calls ‘culture’, because in fact, it never existed. Among prominent public figures one cannot find real innovators; they were just followers who copied cultural patterns that appeared and functioned in completely different ethno-cultural and geo-political circumstances and ruling political regimes which all disappeared in turmoil events of the revolutionary epoch that started in 1914. The author states, we still do not know about any prominent piece of art, literature or whatsoever creation that was produced by and under the influence of the ZUNR when it was the state of western Ukrainians, or was dedicated to it. Everything we have today is the cultural product of the inter-war and further (diaspora) epochs. Works of culture, may they be called in this way, were unlikely to come into being given the short term of the Ukrainian state in Galicia and most unfavourable for cultural development factors.

Therefore, Monolatii formulates a few hypotheses or questions:

1) One cannot be quite confident when saying ‘the culture of the ZUNR or ZOUNR’, but speak mainly about certain manifestations of the cultural life in Galicia

during the war and political conflicts, the Ukrainian-Polish War in particular.

2) The cultural life of 1918–1919 lacked an institutional network (theatres, museums, libraries etc.).

3) Was the culture of the ZUNR-ZOUNR just a culture ‘without properties’ (Galician as such) whose representatives chose the strategy that was oriented towards the all-Ukrainian culture, thus proving the absence of any sign of autonomism or separatism in the cultural life of 1918-1919?

4) Did the founders of Western Ukrainian statehood understand the importance of culture? This would open the way to understanding whether ZUNR-ZOUNR had any cultural policy, whether the development of ‘culture’ was seen as directly dependent on the support from the state.

5) Did the cultural life of those days end at the level of the civic society (but not at the level of, for example, governmental bodies)? Was it just unconscious imitation of successful cultural patterns of the previous epochs prior to 1914?

6) And finally, was the cultural life of 1918–1919 in Galicia catalysed by the events that were far remote in time, but could be recognized as ‘butterflies’?

Monolatii stresses that the answers to the above and other questions would provide the understanding of the type of the culture where a human being of the revolutionary epoch in Galicia found himself, was it the imperial or post-imperial. And furthermore, what was the culture by its aspiration? Was it socialist, radical or conservative? The author states that the revolutionary epoch of 1914–1923 was the epoch of violence, the epoch of mass killings. Thus, the culture of that epoch was, rightfully or not, the *culture of murder* in the first place, while in the Galician conditions it had clear anti-Polish sounding.

To summarize the essay, the author convinces, the phenomenon that occurred historically in the times of the war and political conflicts in Galicia in 1918–1919 was not in fact a culture in its broad meaning, but a cult. In its essence, on the post-imperial Galician terrains this phenomenon was characteristic of *populus simplex* and/or idealistic motives of the hierarchical division of the world into *sacrum* and *profanum*. For this reason, the drama, the cultural one in particular that unfolded in Galicia in 1918–1919 (and because of the wider context of the *culture of murder* in the times of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1914–1923) could equally be an example of *the culture of the Vertep drama*.

Is the above said the reason why the ‘Galician cultural situation’ is a sample of the ‘traditional’ world map that has remained untouched by Art Nouveau in all its splendour and/or ugliness? The author’s answer is as follows, that never happened given the latent Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Galicia since the mid-19th – early 20th centuries along with a few political killings in 1900-1910 that symbolised the fight between the political cultures of two ‘Galician Piedmonts’. Hence, the political killings of Marko Kahanets, Andrzej Kazimierz Potocki, Adam Kotsko, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria (and even the death of Ivan Franko) when being powerful attractors and causing deterministic chaos for the Ukrainian-Polish relations in Galicia, impinged upon the way the imaginary culture of ZUNR-ZOUNR worked. Its core representative was not *Homo Ludens*, a ‘Playing Man’ (this could have been in peaceful times), but *Homo Militaris* a ‘Military Man’.

As the final comments, one should revert to the author’s foreword which reminds the reader that after the French Revolution Jardin des plantes (‘Garden of Plants’) in Paris got a small zoo with animals from the royal menagerie at Versailles. One of its tasks was to

enlighten people. Monolatii is convinced, when the Ukrainian Revolution of 1914-1923 ended, nobody had any time to think of a *Ukrainian* zoological garden. Therefore, today it is important to look upon Black Swans, Gray Rhinos and other political animals of Western Ukrainian statehood through the lens of the randomness theory of the 20th – early 21st centuries, as well as apply some common sense. What is more important is that one should go beyond just looking, but identify those who are buffoons on the political scene of Ukraine, so that this small historic experience could finally teach *something* to *someone*.