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Юрій Косевич, Богдан Мицкан

ФІЛОСОФСЬКІ АСПЕКТИ, ТАК ЗВАНОВОГО, "ВІЛЬНОГО" ЧАСУ*

У статті розглядається концепція не використаного, так званого вільного часу, і різних його визначень, які пов'язані з ним. Припускається, що суб'єкт не може мати вільного часу у його розпорядженні, тому що час не стосується його. Не має вільного часу у його розпорядженні в минулому, суб'єкт не може формувати його ні в сьогоденні, ні в майбутньому. Вільний час не стосується його взагалі, оскільки вільний час, як таке, не існує взагалі. Ми тільки повинні говорити про використаний час. Тобто, це те, що стосується минулого і сьогодення. У майбутньому час ще не існує і в цьому сенсі його використання є неможливим.

Крім того, розглядається, що існування, розуміння і можливість пізнання часу, як такого, не є можливим. Таким чином, автори відкидають різні загальні теорії часу. Він відноситься до кантівської, суб'єктивної, "само-пов'язаної" концепції часу і тому його треба розглядати в контексті Хайдеггерівської трансцендентальної теорії часу. На нашу думку, це цілком виправдано, зокрема зважаючи на міркування про буття древніх філософів, а саме: Анаксимандра, Піфагора і його послідовників, Парменіда, Платона і Аристотеля.

Ключові слова: відпочинок, історія, займати час, не займати час, буття, Кантівська теорія часу, Хайдеггерівська теорія часу.

In the paper the hitherto conception of free time and various definitions which are connected with it are challenged. The author assumed that the subject may not have free time at his/her disposal, because that time does not concern him/her at all. S/he did not have free time at his/her disposal in the past, s/he can shape it

neither in the present nor in the future. Free time does not concern him/her at all, because free time as such does not exist at all. We have only to do with occupied and non-occupied time. The first form of time concerns the past and the present. The future time is not occupied in that sense that it does not exist yet and that it never exists.

Moreover the author considers the existence, understanding and possibility of cognition of time as such. Thus he rejects various common theories of time. He refers to the Kantian, subjective, "self-related" conception of time and he attempts to strengthen it with the Heideggerian transcendental theory of time. According to the author, it derives from, inter alia, considerations on being of ancient philosophers such: Anaximander, Pythagoras and his followers, Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle.

Keywords: *leisure, history, occupied time, non-occupied time, being, Kantian theory of time, Heideggerian theory of time.*

Introduction. The aim of that disquisition is not in the least to give an account of the dispute on the existence of free time. Generally, I have no information about such a dispute. It concerns rather my questioning the existence of free time as such and contexts justifying thesis on the existence of that time. As a consequence, it leads to coming into argument with that kind of views.

Namely, I am of an opinion – maybe a perverse one – that if it is assumed, according to the most often applied distinctions, that free time is free since it is free of work, it may, paradoxically, turn out that all we do, all we perform, all our conduct, all activities connected with work, with duties, as well as the other various activities of a physical, mental or relational character (the last of them are activities related to other persons or sacral beings in the religious and non-religious sense) take place in time free of other forms of activity: that is of actions concerning work or unconnected with it, which may have pleasant or not very pleasant qualities. I emphasise once again that all we do is always done in time free of other occupations – connected or unconnected with other duties. Simply, we can do nothing more in time which is already occupied by us (Kosiewicz 2004a).

Research purpose – historical and philosophical views employment the time to rest.

Results

I. A Dispute on the Existence of Free Time

Free time, occupied time and unoccupied time. Even if we spend time in a pleasant way, it is filled up time, time occupied by pleasures. It is not time free of pleasures, but filled up with them – that is, it is busy, not free, time. Thus, the next pleasures may take place (other forms of activities may occur) only after the completion of the previous activities, what means: in time free of the previous activities.

According to this understanding, free time means time unoccupied by anything else, and using the up to now interpretation of free time, which (if understood in the broadest possible way) meant time free of work, loses its significance and even becomes senseless.

This viewpoint is confirmed in a sense by Aristotle, who proclaims in "Nicomachean Ethics" that "Free time is not the end of work, but work is the end of free time, which should be devoted to art, studies and, first of all, to philosophy". It follows from this definition – regardless what is the end of what and how much free time is appreciated – that that time, similarly as working time, is not free of activities. Quite the opposite: it should be filled up either with art, or with studies, or with philosophy. And if it is filled, it is not free. Moreover, I call your attention to the fact that although occupying oneself with art, studies or philosophy may bring pleasure, it is usually connected with time-consuming and exhausting work. I experience it by myself dealing with theatre, teaching and philosophy (Kosiewicz 2004a).

Regarding issues of free time further, not so much from the viewpoint of "Nicomachean Ethics", but from the social perspective characteristic for the age of slavery, it is possible to proclaim that the pointed out time is the time of free people, who, unlike slaves, have freedom, have time which is free – independent from serfdom – at their disposal. We

may imagine that if they are free, their time is also free. That its value is enhanced in two ways – namely, with freedom from and freedom for. That free people are free for example from the obligation to work, from will and decision of the owner of slaves. That free people have also freedom of undertaking any activity connected with the status of the free man. However, regardless the situation of free people or their place in the hierarchy of the ancient society (and not only of it), time they could or can have at their disposal – regardless how it is called – is always occupied time.

Free Time and Consciousness. According to the interpretation I propose, we have to do with occupied time and unoccupied time – that is, with free time (free, since it is not occupied). However, free time – that is, time which is not occupied at all – does not exist. Regarding the man as a being conscious of his existence, it may be assumed that free time never currently – that is, in the time being, at present – exists. Free time is time of abstract, conceptual qualities. It maybe only envisaged by the subject and may regard the future (although not only).

In connection with the above statements, the man beyond consciousness is the only form of the human being who possesses free time, although there is no way he could realize what he possesses. The fact that he has free time is known by other people, but not by the discussed person. The discussed person cannot dispose of that time, in contrast to other individuals keeping the unconscious being alive.

It may be also said- referring to the views of a protestant thinker J. Moltman – that the man has free time (in a similar sense of the word) after the death of the soul and the body – when he waits first for resurrection, then for salvation. M. Luther – Moltman's protoplast – proclaimed theory of "sleep of the soul", the view called hypnopsychism. He maintained that when the man departs, his body dies and waits together with the soul, utterly passive at that time – which, *nota bene*, is not occupied by anything, since the soul is sunk in something like lethargic sleep – for the Last Judgement (Krokiewicz 1995).

Of course the man – a being who in a biological sense does not exist anymore – is given, from the viewpoint of Moltman's views, free time which belongs to him, time free of everything. However, there is no way he could dispose of it, since he is conscious neither of his gifts, nor of possibilities connected with them, since he does not know – and cannot know – that the break between the earthly life and the resurrection for the eternal life in an eschatological perspective is spare time for him, which is utterly free of any form of human activity.

On the other hand, for the man conscious of his existence, the past has been always busy time – time occupied by something what was of greater or smaller importance for him. Thus, there was never free time in the past. Moreover, the past is time which does not belong to us and does not depend on us anymore, since it has irretrievably passed. And the real state of this time – that is, its real contents, which does not exist anywhere except of memories anymore – will never undergo any change. It can be treated as free time in another sense: free of our influence, of any interference in its real contents and structure.

Exceptions in this respect may only be recollective modifications or confabulations, fabrications of something what in fact does not exist or has not existed.

Mythology, mystical experiences and prayer according to temporal interpretation. The above mentioned confabulations pointing out to the existence of free time appear *inter alia* in holy books, for example in biblical records taking into account the existence of paradise or heaven. Thus, they exist in the realm of considerations connected with the religiously determined supra-natural world.

Its existence is recognized, confirmed by believers of a given faith. Scholars and philosophers coming from beyond their circle do not share that opinion. They have not found

sufficient argumentation of a logical character concerning this issue. There are also no reasons to presume on those grounds that free time being present in scriptural records exists, since there are doubts about the existence of the supra-natural world where that time is supposed to be.

In a similar way the so-called suspension of time – that is, the suspension of its passing, of its influence – may be regarded. It reportedly takes place during vertical communication – for example between a clergyman and the religious Absolute. During that contact (according to the opinion of theologians and philosophers of religious provenance) even a direct contact with God may take place. It means a phenomenon of a mystical character - that is, mystical ecstasy when the man, and especially his soul, undergo a longer or a shorter (depending on a given thinker's opinions) annihilation, dissolution in a supra-natural being. Due to that, because of God's absolute causative power, the existence of the man as an autonomous corporeal/spiritual being becomes suspended in the limited time. The soul dissolved in God loses human properties, since - in an act of absolute bliss - it permeates into and dissolves in something what is fully ideal. Hence, bodily functions of the human body temporarily deprived of the soul (which, *nota bene*, animates the body) stop. It remains from that viewpoint in something like lethargy – it exists as if beyond time – until the revitalization of the human being, the reunification of the soul with the body, takes place.

Aurelius Augustine proclaims for example that during mystical unification the human soul does not dissolve in God, that the subject exists separately as a fully autonomous being, that it cognizes the truth in an act of divine illumination delighting in that form of mystical elation from a distance (which is simultaneously a specific ecstasy of an epistemic character – direct and non-cognitive – since epistemological reflection comes later). In contrast with the earlier form of experience, we have in that case to do with external (extraspective, but non-sensual) perception, with partner-like unification of two subjects which are autonomous (in the ontological sense): the divine one and the human one. In the case of Aurelius Augustine's views, it does not mean however that there is no suspension of time when a given subject communes with the Absolute (Kosiewicz 2004b).

According to that philosopher, the pointed out union, called also direct grace, may concern any person chosen by God. He may grant it even to some bloody villain or some foul lecherous woman. The divine vertical communication appears, similarly as in the case of the prayer of a strong believer, who loses the sense of time and it seems to him that it alienates himself from the whole social and natural context and comes into a new metaphysical sacral dimension, that he exists out of time (Kosiewicz 2004b).

However, that illusion – both in the case of mystical elation and during the above mentioned prayer – does not mean that real suspension of time takes place. That time still passes, in spite of the fact that the ecstatic or praying subject does not perceive it, that it seems to him that – because of that extremely exceptional situation – it has been stopped or annihilated especially for him, while the psyche, dedicated to higher emotional experiences, and the organic body which is connected with it still function during that elation. Thus, that suspension concerns neither the individual, nor social and natural environment which is connected with him.

Even if it is assumed that that suspension is a form of free time or liberation from worldly time, in the first case that time is occupied by ecstasy and in the second the subject is entangled in that experience too, because it experiences mysticism. A given experience is not only an epistemological category, but also a temporal category, since the experience exists in time – it lasts shorter or longer. That who experiences is not free of experience – he is a subject who is made busy by that experience. Both during the first and the second form of mystical unification, as well as during prayer, the subject – from the viewpoint of autonomous philosophy – is busy and the notion of free time does not concern him.

On the prisoner and the slave. There may arise a doubt concerning the situation of the prisoner who is deprived of any possibility of creative or non-creative activity during the time of serving his sentence and who – colloquially speaking – has too much free time.

Regarding that issue from the viewpoint of the research perspective (theoretical convention) adopted in this text, it may be stated that the time the prisoner has at his disposal is only seemingly free time, since, as a matter of fact, it is fully occupied time. The prisoner has lost his freedom, thus his time is fully occupied – seized by the punishment resulting from regulations of the penal code which has been ruthlessly imposed on him. The prisoner's time is fully occupied, even if he is absolutely passive and he is not busy with anything, he does nothing – that is, he is not active in any way. His seemingly absolutely free time is fully used up – occupied by the judiciary. The prisoner suffers just because of that reason that he is not free, that he has been deprived of freedom, that he has not free time (even if he has a lot of time for himself) while serving his punishment. Thus, for example, participation in various activities connected with movement recreation is in that case one of forms of his resocialization provided for by the judiciary and the penitentiary system.

From that viewpoint, the slave's time is also non-free time; that is, fully appropriated time – occupied by the master; that is, by the owner of the slave.

A similar situation appears in the case of the prisoner's or the slave's sleep. When one or the other of them sleeps, their time is not free time because of at least two reasons.

Firstly, because that type of time – similarly as time of liberated individuals or other persons from outside prison – is time occupied by physiologically determined processes which are necessary for the regeneration of human vital powers. It is time occupied by rest which is necessary for biological renewal and existence. In that sense, sleep has somehow unintentional character, since it is a forced biologically determined periodical phenomenon resulting from vital functions of the organism.

Secondly, that sleep, nap or rest take place during serving the sentence or at time fully appropriated by the owner of the slave. Thus, they appear in non-free time. That time is disposed by other subjects who have control of human beings deprived of their freedom. Due to that, the above mentioned – that is, enslaved – beings are not, speaking in a Kantian way, beings in themselves, but reified beings constituting – from the viewpoint of the society approving of slavery or the prison as the precondition for resocialization – means to the achievement of a social order as a value which is the highest in a given situation – that is, which constitutes an aim in itself. In that sense, that aim is an absolute value and the prisoner or the slave are relative values.

If given individuals are not deprived of knowledge that they are in a situation which is highly uncomfortable for them, they fill their consciousness with, *inter alia*, reflections concerning just that entanglement.

It refers also to unemployed persons and those who are retired persons or pensioners. Their time is always occupied time, even when they do not do any job or any other work.

Taking into account only the biological aspect of human existence – both in the case of the free man and the enslaved one – it can be proclaimed that their time is always occupied, even when they are deprived of awareness of their own existence. Their organisms are always occupied with maintaining vital functions, they are always active as functional structures according to Ludwig von Bertalanffy's understanding (Bergson 1963).

Considering that issue according to the cultural interpretation, in the relation to traditionally understood free time, it may be stated that time dedicated for and filled with movement activity or recreation of any other kind – is not, as a matter of fact, free time, since it is occupied by the activity which takes place. It is also occupied with various activities or considerations both before and after that activity.

Time in the mirror of conventions. For the man conscious of his own being and the passage of time, free time exists neither in the present, nor in the past, nor in the future (even if only because of that reason that that time has not come into being yet).

If its existence is pointed out, it happens solely on the principle of the applied convention authorizing to formulate such a context of justification which is coherent with it.

Both in the first and in the second case we have to do with conventionalism; that is, with the application of a convention confirming, on the one hand, that free time does not exist and, on the other hand, that it surely is.

When it is assumed that free time exists, as it takes place, for example, in researches on sport for all, it turns out that the formulation of a universally binding definition of free time is, as a matter of fact, a task impossible to be accomplished, similarly as in the case of many other notions characteristic for the humanities. According to, among others, Karl Popper, every attempt to define *e.g.* religion, culture, personality or health includes a mark of *fallibilism*, which is noticed sooner or later – a harbinger of the future fall; that is, a mistake, a shortcoming, a controversial statement (Moltmann 1995). Thus, those attempts leave some epistemological deficiency, as well as an impression that those interpretations can be changed, modified, improved.

Whenever I analyse some definition of free time, I find that it is neither full, nor universal; that it can be referred only to the context of the book or the paper where it appears; that it is not up to its tasks and undergoes falsification when other theoretical assumptions, other viewpoints are assumed as the basis for considerations. Thus, in the case of free time – as well as of other notions such as personality, health, culture, religion, education, etc. – we have to do with plurality of standpoints, interpretations, considerations, definitions, which are applied accordingly to the adopted research option.

When the starting point is constituted for example by Mircea Eliade's philosophical and culturological conceptions, it turns out that man from the beginning of his history has organized his free time motivated by an idiogenetic – that is, innate – need of experiencing sanctity and that the proper understanding of the world, of various man's aims or the issue of free time is possible only in the sacral perspective (Dumazedier 1962, Eliade 1988).

Naturally, such a perspective in considerations on free time, similarly as other more or less controversial conceptions, may arouse various reservations. Nevertheless, the impossibility of unambiguous specification of this notion does not mean that problems of free time should not be dealt with. Henri Bergson even maintains – giving the soul and the body as examples – that it is permissible to voice one's own views on various issues, to study and to define them and to write academic dissertations being unaware of their nature and without knowledge what their essence consists in (Arystoteles 1981). It refers also to free time, even if you are of an opinion that it does not exist.

II. Time from Ontological and Epistemological Perspective

Considerations on free time do not exempt from the obligation not only to define how free time is understood, but also to explain the notion of time as such. It refers also to the dispute on its existence, especially that independently from the position, the viewpoint or the convention free, occupied and non-occupied time constitute parts of time as such.

In the presented text I am going to be in favour of, first of all, Kantian and Heideggerian interpretation of time. The combination of Kant's and Heidegger's reflection consists in pairing up the concepts which according to the latter were mutually exclusive – that is, in forming an association between that what is subjective and that what is universal in comprehending time.

Time – as it can be proclaimed on the basis of the German hermeneutist views – is given to the subject by Being in an epistemic sense. The subject – as an organic entity –

emerges just from Being, and time can be perceived by the man only in an intuitive way – in a clearing – and only in extremely unique situations. In spite of that, it has – as it will be presented later – a universal character.

On the other hand, according to Kant’s interpretation, time has an *a priori* character because of that reason that it has not *a posteriori* qualities. It is also subjective, since it is perceptible as clear non-materialised envisagement springing from abstraction. It is also perceived each time – similarly like in Heidegger’s case (although with a different context of justification) – in an intuitive way.

Kant and time. If we perceive time in a Kantian way we may proclaim that it has an anthropological character. It is a strictly human property. It is, regarding its source, anthropocentric, since it derives from man and can be thought and perceived only by him. It is a man-made conception, but it is not “a discursive or, as it is said, general notion” (Heidegger 1989, p. 109). It is subjective and simultaneously – as a “pure form of sensual envisagement” (Heidegger 1989 p. 109) – it has an *a priori* character. It is not given from outside; thus, it is not an effect of extraspective experience, in spite of the fact that – from the commonsense viewpoint – its influence and passing, its effects are constantly experienced (Heidegger 1989, p. 107). “Time is not” – as it is written by Immanuel Kant – “something existing for itself or something things are entitled to have as their objective description” (Heidegger 1989, p. 110) – “it is not anything else, but a form of an inner sense, (...) it cannot be a description of external phenomena” (Heidegger 1989, p. 111). It is not given us *a posteriori* “and that is why it must be possible to consider it completely separately from any sensation” (Heidegger 1989, p. 95).

According to Kant’s opinion, “Time is a necessary idea which underlies any envisaged data. It is impossible to completely remove time from phenomena, although it is quite possible to remove time phenomena. Thus, time is given *a priori*. The reality of phenomena is possible only in it. They can be eliminated completely, but time itself (as a general precondition of their possibility) is irremovable” (Heidegger 1989, pp. 107-108).

Time has neither universal, nor objective qualities, since every individual experiences it and describes in a different way. If it is not universal and objective, it is relative – that is, relativised to a given individual. It is given him in a direct way, he creates time and statements on its qualities. According to the Königsberg genius, “time is only a subjective precondition, which is necessary for envisaged perceptions to take place in us, since only then that form of inner envisagement may be presented before things – that is *a priori*” (Heidegger 1989, p. 111).

That is why it can be supposed that those “envisaged perceptions”, “inner envisagement”, “a clear form of sensual envisagement” are, as a matter of fact, non-empirical intuitive cognition reaching directly that what is abstract and what cannot be cognized in another way. Certainly “it is not intellectual perception” (Heidegger 1989, p. 136).

I agree with Kant that time is subjective (“outside the subject it is nothing”, Heidegger 1989, p. 115) and that it has an *a priori* character, that it can be imagined and thought. His context of justification seems to be convincing in this respect. On the other hand, doubts may be arisen by the statement that it is given to the subject directly. Although the Königsberg philosopher proclaims clearly that it is given directly as abstract – that is, clear – envisagement, he does not strengthen that statement with sufficient and necessary argumentation. According to my opinion, Martin Heidegger’s ontological views would be helpful in this case and I will refer to them in a later part of my argument.

I am of an opinion that we experience time neither in the epistemic, nor in the ontic way. It can be only thought and, hence, intelligible in a causative sense which is not known by me. That is why it can be thought (it can be penetrated by thoughts in some sense, which cannot be defined by me) and it can constitute a foundation for epistemological reflection –

nota bene in spite of lack of an epistemic basis. If time can constitute a basis for epistemological reflection, it can be ontologically characterized in spite of lack of an ontic basis. Then we attribute it, *inter alia*, with properties of a hypostasis.

We experience only that what happens during its lasting – *i.e.* we experience effects of its lasting, what means all forms or manifestations of changeability which are accessible for us. If we experience its presence it takes place only in an indirect way – on condition that it exists as a being: regardless of its form, even when it exists solely as a hypostasis. From that viewpoint, time is completely non-empirical. It has an *a priori* character in that sense as Arch-four according to Pythagoreans' interpretation, the Demiurge according to Plato's understanding or the First Cause and the First Mover in Aristotle's philosophy. It can be cognized only intuitively, independently from experience. Maybe it exists objectively, but it is impossible to be indisputably proved – both in the epistemological and the ontological sense.

That is why it is difficult to define what time is and what are his most important properties.

The subject cognizes only manifestations of influence of time, and time as such is in no way given to him as a set of definite properties.

Admittedly, it can be tried to define time on the basis of effects of its influence, but it is not an argument which would be sufficient and entitling in an indisputable way to formulate statements about its ontological qualities, about its essence.

Heidegger – Being and time. Yes – I concur with Kant's and Heidegger's opinion; their conceptions of time connected into a specific selective whole seem to be the most proper from the viewpoint of considerations included in the text (that is, in a conventionalist sense). I act in such a way in spite of the fact that, according to Heidegger, time in Kant's interpretation has a "self-related" – that is, subjective – character – what is something, as I have pointed out, the German hermeneutist does not agree with (Heidegger 1994, p. 349).

Referring to his philosophy, time can be treated as a non-physical (that is, a non-material) and hence an abstract being and its manifestations (that is, objectivisation of its possibilities, "enowning" or "properizing" (Heidegger 1994, p. 357)) can be perceived in material entities – organic ones and non-organic ones – emerging from the abstract pre-ground called Being (Heidegger 1994, p. 353), constituting the foundation of the natural world.

Metaphysical Being is experienced by subjects in at least two ways. Firstly, because it exists in a particular entity – *e.g.* in a human individual – in spite of the fact that the subject is unable to define its essence and other properties, both if it treats it as something what exists as a whole of uncognizable and incomprehensible properties of metaphysical Being and if it treats as something what exists in particular entities (Heidegger 1985, pp. 493–510 and 567–610). Secondly, as a form of Being which can be directly experienced only in a clearing (Heidegger 1985, pp. 491–493, Hegel 1990). It appears extremely rarely, only in unique and outstanding subjects. Then they become shepherds protecting the truth of Being (Hegel 1990).

They start to be shepherds of Being, but also of its various forms of manifesting itself including manifestations of time – that is, time not only as a pure abstraction unconnected with anything, but also as a metaphysical constituent dissolved in Being. First of all, however, they become shepherds of Being – that is, shepherds protecting the truth of being of time; shepherds who take care of its direct connections and one-way influence (since "the entity's being is care"), and who take care of immanent relations concerning inevitable passing of time, which changes the human individual and the ecological niche, but not time.

Thus, the subject-shepherd protects existence – in other words, that what exists in time. He protects the truth of being of his own existence. It gives the subject two aims to achieve – tasks of epistemological/anthropological overtone. Firstly, he must protect the truth of that what he has intuitively perceived in a clearing which appeared in him and what is the

metaphysical and non-individual form of time dissolved in never recognizable Being, which can be perceived only with a help of artistic (and especially poetic), incommunicable intuition experienced in a deep – individual and subjective – way. Secondly, as a shepherd he must protect and take care of his own life (his own entity) – that is, that Being saturates his entity with, that what causes its lasting and transformations.

Maybe that abstract Being is simultaneously non-actualised time, that is – referring to Heidegger – the Time everything results from. Thus, it is non-identified Being all entities – organic and non-organic subjects and objects – emerge from and they are inseparably connected with it, subjected to its influences, imprinted with its mark. On that basis it can be stated that Being is Time and Time is Being shrouded with longer or shorter existing entities. Time and entities actualise themselves in a sense in the same way as – according to Maxime the Confessor – it was with the sex of first parents after they had left proto-historical Paradise.

Heidegger, however, presents a different viewpoint when he proclaims that “*Worldly time is, however, also more “subjective” than every possible subject, since that time – in a properly understood sense of care as being of a really existing Self – makes only that being possible.*” “Time” is present neither in the “subject”, nor in the object, neither “inside”, nor “outside” and it “is” “*earlier*” than every subjectivity and every objectivity, since it constitutes a precondition of possibility even of that “earlier”. Thus, has it any “being” at all? And if it has not, is it an illusion, or maybe something “being more” than any possible being?” (Heidegger 1985, p. 585). Thus the German thinker points out to the possibility of subjective experience of time, since it is the reason and a manifestation of the subject’s care and concern about that what happens in himself and properizes itself in other entities. He points also out that it is not, however something strictly subjective in the genetic sense – as it was in the case of Kant (although it can be subjectively experienced), since it originates neither from the subject nor from the object, it does not belong to them and does not depend on them. It exists neither inside the subject, nor outside of it. Heidegger points out that time is something what is both before and outside the subject as well as before and outside nature, that it is something earlier in its relations to entities (*Nota bene* Heidegger presents also other descriptions of time, e.g.: “Time is groundlessness of concentration which moves away” (Heidegger 1993, p. 357), “Time inhabits never moving” (Heidegger 1993, p. 358). The exegesis of their meaning would not, however, contribute much to understanding of the text, since he considers a given interpretation of time in its relation to space.

That what is common for Heidegger and Kant in their reflection on time is the subject’s possibility of taking a subjective stance on it, even if there are doubts concerning the very existence of time. Although G. I. Berkeley maintained that to be is to be perceived, he proclaimed it as an adherent of extreme empiricism. His famous sentence might be recognized as legitimate in the field of the epistemology of time if that perception could include also intuitive perceiving.

On the other hand, that what makes Heidegger different from the Enlightenment thinker – and which simultaneously can support and supplement his thoughts – is a view that in a clearing the man may see the truth of Being and non-objectified time, which is grounded in it and which properizes itself in nature, although it is not its property. In that sense, that what according to Kant was subjective obtains, thanks to Heidegger, a metaphysical non-subjective source character as well as a pre-existential and universal basis. Thus, time – combining Kant with Heidegger and using notions of the Königsberg philosopher – is mediated in the noumenal world: the abstract or the metaphysical one, which is sensually inaccessible and perceived intuitively by the subject or in the subject when a direct possibility of experiencing that what appears in a noumenal clearing becomes active in the discussed subject. That is why that what is subjective in Kant’s case loses its strictly subjective overtone and is agreeable with the Heideggerian non-subjective, non-cosmological, non-external

(non-worldly and non-intra-subjective) conception of time, although only the subject can think about time and express about it its more or less accurate opinions – including opinions on existence and possible properties of free, occupied or non-occupied time.

Heideggers' and Greek philosophers' attitude towards metaphysical matter. Considering time according to its Heideggerian interpretation – as a being which is transcendental in its relation to nature and which exists also independently from man, who can intuitively and exceptionally perceive it in a clearing – it is possible to see that roots of Heideggerian ontology (including also his ontology and epistemology of time) reach not only the philosophy of the pre-Socratic Eleates – that is, in a given case, Parmenides' inquiries – but considerably deeper; that is, as far as philosophy and metaphysics of nature of Anaximander – the most outstanding, according to my opinion, philosopher of early Greek antiquity. The German hermeneutist was also – as I suppose – inspired by Plato and Aristotle and their metaphysics, and especially by conceptions of abstractly understood matter – that is, so-called prime or primary matter, possessing neither quantitative, nor qualitative properties: non-physical, non-sensual and hence possessing a metaphysical status.

That is why the notion of the transcendental being (including also Heideggerian Being and time, which is transcendental in its relation to entities) is applicable, for example, not only to one position in the field of the dispute on universals in its classical – Medieval – as well as mathematical (presented by Willard Van Omar Quine in considerations entitled *Z punktu widzenia logiki /From a Logical Point of View/*, (Popper 1992, pp. 9–34)) form and not only to the notion of the being which is external in its relation to another, but also in relation to the preternatural, supernatural, supranatural, ideal, spiritual, absolute divine being.

That being – which is transcendental and simultaneously ideal – is perceived in the philosophical tradition at least in two ways: firstly, as a preternatural being of divine qualities (that is, sacral in some sense), but deprived of any connections with religion (that is, of abstract, metaphysical qualities); and, secondly, as the absolute sacral being marked with divinity and described by religious assumptions (dogmas) – that is, of religious, denominational provenance.

In order to distinguish the ideal being which is purely philosophical and non-denominational from the notion of the divine being coming from a denomination a notion differentiating those forms of beings has been introduced. The first was called the transcendental being and the second – the transcendent being.

The Kantian notion of the noumenal world and Heideggerian categories of Being and time – constituting a pre-ground and pre-existential (metaphysical) foundation of that what is phenomenal in Kant's ontology and what is the entity in Heidegger's views – fall just into the range of the notion of the transcendental being

Anaximander's principium and Heidegger's Being and time. Anaximander – the main Milesian philosopher – takes among Greek naturalists a special place, since as the first he abandoned cognitive reflection based on superficial observation of nature and he introduced speculative inquiries independent from empirical cognition – especially concerning the issues of the source (of transcendental character) and emergence of animate and inanimate matter (*nota bene* he was a hylozoist, since he emphasised that the whole nature is animate, since it remains in constant motion). As a matter of fact, the basis and the source of ontological inspiration of not only philosophers of Greek antiquity, but also – what is especially important in the case of these considerations – of Heidegger himself is constituted just by Anaximander's conception of metaphysical, abstract, continuous unchangeable, indestructible and immortal matter, which, according to Aristotle, was described by him as the first as the principium (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 79) – that is, the principle – transcendental and fundamental *apeiron*-boundlessness, a reservoir of matter, infinity, indefiniteness.

Admittedly the German thinker does not mention it, but – as I think – it is indubitable that the ontological conception of his “Being and Time” derives, more or less indirectly, just from Anaximander’s “pan-reality” divided into two parts. One of them is constituted by the infinite multiplicity of particular worlds and the other by the infinite and still principium, which has the character of the sovereign and ultimate reality and which – unlike the first part – is sensually inaccessible and is only possible to be perceived by thoughts (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 82).

It is just there where the germ of Heideggerian conception of metaphysical Being (of unique properties and values of, *inter alia*, the source and the cause, which are stressed also with the capital “B”) and entities originating from it can be found. That Being is, according to Anaximander’s interpretation, nothing else but the principium, metaphysically conceived nature, which is abstract, boundless (as the first principle and element he assumed that what is boundless) (Von Bertalanffy 1984, p. 77) and indefinite essence, which is the source of inexhaustible and endless resources the whole “infinite multiplicity of particular worlds” (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 83) gradually and continuously emerges from. It, unlike the metaphysical nature, exists in time, arises and dies, changes more or less in the physical respect depending on its qualitative and quantitative properties. Thus, together with the physical world, time (eternally existing and remaining as if in lethargy) originates and its properties – which in the abstract world, similarly as properties of the physical being, are included in the realm of possibility) manifest themselves.

The unchangeable sequence of originating and dying worlds and their history are “determined by mighty and just time, a symbol of the boundless principium (...). “Time” is only there where there are worlds. There where they are not – that is, in the principium – (...) there is only constantly unchangeable “eternity”” (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 82).

It leads to a conclusion that although time is primarily and according to the common sense associated with nature, it does not belong to it as its essential internal property. Admittedly, it underlies it as the principium or Heideggerian Being, but – similarly as in the famous hermeneutist’s works – it is neither intra-worldly (or intuitively perceived by unique entities-subjects), nor worldly (that is, objectively given, like in the case of Isaac Newton’s or Albert Einstein’s views). It emerges from the abstract principium and from metaphysical Being. It is still something sufficiently abstract and ideal to be “divine”, something showing changeability and temporalisation of the cosmos, and – considering its source – it initiates and stops its activation and eternity in the preground; that is in the Being and in the principium.

Pythagorean Arch-four and time. A similar view – in the sense of a transcendental and metaphysical viewpoint in reflection on nature and its cause (with a different context of justification) is presented by Pythagoreans. They assume (*nota bene*, in their case we can use the category of collective consciousness – common philosophical knowledge) – as it is maintained by Aristotle (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 97) – that the number “is the principium both in the meaning of matter for existing things (that is, primary matter, metaphysical matter – my parenthetic remark) as well as in the meaning of the form” (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 98). It refers to the number ten, which was worshipped by Pythagoreans as the arch-perfect number which includes the whole essence of numbers. They called it “Arch-four”. They drew however a significant distinction between the ten and the Arch-four. “Creative power (*dynamis*)” was ascribed by them only to the latter and they described it also as the source and mainstay of the eternal current of nature (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 97). It constitutes the essence of the sensual world, determines its dimension, shape and quantity of particular parts as well as the unity and the shape of the whole (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 99).

Both the abstract reality and the sensual reality emerge from the Arch-four. That Pythagorean absolute exteriorizes from itself (since it has also those properties) both matter of

metaphysical qualities and numbers (*nota bene* Aristotle was aware that Pythagoras regarded the “number” as the material and formal reason of all “objects” (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 100). That number performs in a way the function of Aristotle’s form – it gives the first matter, by coming with it in a close direct connection – quantitative and qualitative perceptible properties. Other numbers exist independently from things and from the human mind.

That is why we have to do with an anti-psychological stance pointing out that besides the physical world there exists also a supernatural world composed of numbers, which can be – in the nomological sense (in contrast with the nomotetic interpretation) – gradually discovered, explained and understood by man only with his mind. Those numbers, similarly as Aristotle’s form, dynamise physical matter which has come into being, they stimulate it for changeability. They mark it with a stigma of time. Temporalisation of nature is in a way its most important feature, since it cannot exist beyond time.

Time is a primarily metaphysical category originating from the Arch-four constituting the form of forms of the physical world. In that sense, time is not a property of nature, it is a property of the abstract form, which is not after all a part of the potential sensual world, but only its stimulator and energy. Thus, time is mediated in the metaphysical foundation of the cosmos and results only from it. Things appear and disappear. The metaphysical foundation of the world is eternal and completely independent from nature and entities.

The Arch-four is an almost mature conception of the philosophical absolute. Pythagoreans developed in that respect an idea of Anaximander, who treated the principium also as a divine principle which has neither the beginning, nor the end; as an endless, subtle metaphysically sublimated body. He worshipped its divinity similarly as Thales worshipped divinity of water. In that case we have to do with *sacrum*; that is with the above mentioned divinity of a non-denominational, strictly philosophical character.

Anaximander’s (similarly as Parmenides’) views are closer to Heidegger’s ontology than metaphysical assumptions of Pythagoreans’, Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy of nature, since in the latter idealistic messages and heralds of the Hegelian Absolute can be found. The Pythagorean Arch-four, similarly as the Hegelian absolute, exteriorizes from itself the metaphysical foundation of the phenomenal world. The Platonic Demiurge and Aristotle’s First Cause found eternal, metaphysical matter without any quantitative or qualitative properties and they behave like divine constructors – they create the cosmos. Metaphysical time emerges from abstract matter and its properties – similarly as in the cases analysed in the text – can be only thought. Heidegger rightly remarks “that Hegel with his interpretation of time moves unambiguously towards the common-sense idea of time” (Heidegger 1985, p. 601) proclaiming that “Time as the negative unity of being outside oneself is also something absolutely abstract and ideal. – It is a being of that kind that when it is, it is not and when it is not, it is. It is watched becoming, what means that differences, although absolutely *momentary* – that is directly undergoing annulment – become determined as *external*; that is, external in any case, if only in their relation towards themselves” (Eliade 1966, p. 258).

Hegelian characteristics of time – as it is written, among other things, by the German hermeneutist in his long argument – assumes on the basis of “now” that the latter remains, considering its full structure, covered and smoothed away, in order to make it visible only as something “ideally” present (Heidegger 1985, p. 601).

In contrast to Hegel, all the discussed ancient conceptions of being and time have nothing to do with their commonsense interpretation – even those which to a smaller or a greater degree introduce the conception of the Absolute – the idea which was genially developed and presented by the German idealist at the beginning of the 19th century.

Parmenides – that is, Being as definitional Unity and multiplicity in perception. In Parmenides’ views – the closest to Heidegger’s ontology – we have to do with references to

the predecessors' ontologies, although he uncompromisingly opposed them. In his considerations on beings he came to a conclusion that the foundations of the sensually perceptible world are constituted by the constant, unchangeable, still, continuous, indestructible, complete and present Being which does not include any void. He thought that there exists only “that what is (*aeon*)” – that is, being as such – and “that what is is unborn and indestructible, since it is complete, still and eternal (*ateleston*). It has never been and it will never be, since now it is at once complete, one and uniform” (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 145). There is only it and there is not anything else.

Aristotle, while interpreting views of representatives of the Eleates, appreciates Parmenides' perceptiveness as well as the fact that he not only perceives sensual beings, but also recognizes them as worthy of philosophical reflection – “although he postulates that there is no not-being besides being, he must admit that there is one – namely, the Being and nothing else (...). Forced to abide by observed facts, he admits, however, that the Being is Unity according to the definition, whereas it is multiplicity according to perceptions” (Arystoteles 1988, p. 20).

However, that being as multiplicity – in contrast to the prime (that is, essential and definitional) Being – is for Parmenides an apparent being, which is not understood by him, because it escapes rational perception. He is of an opinion that phenomena characterizing the phenomenal world – that is, multiplicity, movement, continuous change – can be only believed in by the subject, since it cannot know anything about them as they are sensual illusions (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 153). He understands, on the other hand, the world of intellectual notions he is in – that is, the real world, the metaphysical Being.

It leads to a conclusion that time and space have been placed in the metaphysical being – which can be cognized only by reason – independently from the sensual world. If it is assumed that that what is sensually perceived emerges from the intelligible Being perceptible for thoughts, it means that nature – similarly as in Heidegger's views – is entangled in time which is neither outer-worldly, nor intra-worldly; neither subjective, nor objective. It is – as in Kant's case – perceived subjectively, but it is also (like in Heidegger's works) metaphysically determined, dissolved in the Being and perceived only by clearings. Thus, time is a consequently abstract category – both before and after objectification and dynamisation of the world of nature.

In the metaphysical world, similarly as in the cases of Heidegger and other above mentioned post-Anaxagorean ancient philosophers dealing with nature, time has strictly potential properties. They exteriorize themselves and become active together with the emergence of nature. From the pointed out Being – that is, the metaphysical being – the material sensually perceptible being comes into existence. Time influencing the whole nature also emerges from that Being, but – unlike nature – it is not sensually perceptible at all, because it has no physical properties, in spite of the fact that it influences the spatial – quantitative and qualitative – world without exception and brings about inevitable changes in it. Only it from among fragments (entities) of the surrounding physical reality still completely preserves its abstract qualities. Time is not sensually perceived by us, it is not defined in an ontological/empirical sense. It can be only thought and intuitively, directly cognized – in a Bergsonian way. Its existence is only supposed by us.

In the conceptions of nature of all the pointed out thinkers time consequently preserves its metaphysical qualities. Before the objectification of nature that qualities have potential character, after making it physical the qualities of time become objectivised in spite of the fact that they still are not perceptible by human senses.

Platonic time as an image of the eternal being. Plato – as it is proclaimed by Diogenes Laertios – “postulated two beginnings of the universe: the god and matter. The god is

called by him reason and cause, whereas matter complex things come into existence from is regarded by him as shapeless and boundless. Then he says that when matter was moving chaotically, god gathered it in one place, regarding order to be better than chaos” (Von Bertalanffy 1984, p. 194).

In Platonic ontology God, called also the Demiurge, the Creator or Father, created from non-sensual matter the perfect – in the construction-related and functional sense – “body of the world”, which is called, after Pythagoreans, the cosmos – that is, the order. “Considering the shape” – writes Plato – “God gave the world such a shape which matched him the best and which is the most similar to him” (Moltmann 1995, p. 40). God gave it “a smoothed away uniform body (...) the full perfect body composed of perfect bodies” (Moltmann 1995, p. 41). The basis of the creative plan are general proto-patterns – that is, eternal ideas. The world created by the Demiurge remains also in constant motion. Because of hylozoist assumptions, time – as a being or a hypostasis which is also connected with organic movement – must appear.

“When Father gave birth to the world” – writes Plato – “he noticed that it moves and is alive – that world, which had become an image of eternal gods (...) he tried as much as it was possible to make that world eternal (...). Hence [God] decided to create some image of eternal movements and, dealing with creation of the heaven, he created an eternal image of the eternal, still, one being, and he made it to act according to mathematical laws – we call it Time” (Moltmann 1995, p. 45). In that sense, Time as such “is not entitled to have any attributes which the process of becoming give beings moving among sensually perceptible things” (Moltmann 1995, p. 45) and it moves – as it is emphasised by Plato, who refers to Pythagoreans – “according to mathematical laws” (Moltmann 1995, p. 46).

Plato presents a conception of time different from the common-sense one – a transcendental conception of time, which has its basis situated beyond the physical world. Time reflects eternity and abstract mathematical laws. “Time existed, exists and will exist”, because it was created “according to the model of eternal substance” (Moltmann 1995, p. 46) and that model is “the eternal being” (Moltmann 1995, p. 46). It originates from the metaphysical boundlessness, from the non-material world, but it is perceptible, since it activated itself, externalized itself – “it was born together with heaven”. And because the physical world and the philosophical subject have come into being, it is possible to comment on it and formulate statements about it.

Time may also come into existence as objectification of one of eternal ideas of abstract character and that idea is inseparably connected with every form of matter – both with first (metaphysical) matter as well as with sensual (physical) matter. In the first case, both time and its qualities exist potentially – time is dissolved in eternity – whereas in the second case the qualities of time become actualized. Movement and time which is connected with it accompany transformations of the universe and they make it worse as the whole. The whole world become more and more distant from perfection.

Aristotle – that is, time as metaphysical perfection. On the other hand, Aristotle’s Absolute – the First Cause and simultaneously the First Mover – is treated by the Stagiryte not so much as the creator, but as the builder of the universe, who constructs the world from the first matter. It is called also – because of its metaphysical, abstract properties – the non-being the perceptible being emerges from. Aristotle writes that “coming into being from the non-being takes place when [something emerges from] the imperceptible (...) coming into being does not stop, since coming into being is destruction of the non-being, while destruction is coming into being of the non-being” (Aristoteles 1983, p. 20). Thus, a given being comes into existence from the non-being – that is, from matter (from the abstract first matter) and as a result of activity of the intentional reason. Aristotle states that “Everything what comes into

existence comes into existence either as a result of something (I mean it as the beginning of becoming), or of something (I mean it again not as lack, but as matter)” (Arystoteles 1988, p. 175). He confirms it, among others, by writing in another place that “everything what comes into existence – either from nature, or by art – contains matter” – that is, the first matter (Arystoteles 1988, p. 172).

He continues that thought in another place emphasizing that the first matter “is first in two meanings: either first in its relation to the very subject, or first at all (Arystoteles 1988, p. 110). All things have its “nature” composed of matter and form, it is their essence (Arystoteles 1988, p. 110). *Nota bene* the notion of “nature” appears also in different meanings (Arystoteles 1988, pp. 108–110). Thus, for example, Aristotle calls “nature” also “the primary element some natural object either is constructed of, or comes into existence from – that is, the object which is non-shaped and unable to change thanks to its own power” (Arystoteles 1988, p.109) – such as, for example, bronze which is processed by a sculptor into a statue. The first matter is preserved in such an object (Arystoteles 1988, p. 109).

As a result of activity of the intentional reason, spatial movement and circular movement appear. The first is “the first kind of change, and circular movement is the first kind of spatial movement, which is produced by the First Mover. Thus, the first mover is a necessary being” (Arystoteles 1988, p. 314), which – because of its nature – is still and eternal (Arystoteles 1988, p. 317). It is also called by Aristotle in his “Metaphysics” with the names of the divine Reason, the First Eternal Mover and the God-Reason.

“The God-Reason” – states A. Krokiewicz speaking about the Stagiryte’s metaphysics – “is the clear power and he thinks only himself with extensive substrata, so that they all constitute together the whole of the phenomenal universe, which remains in constant motion and which may be called the field of activity of the principal force – that is, of the transcendental God-Reason” (Arystoteles 1988, p. 329). He continues pointing out that Aristotle expresses an opinion that “actuality (activity) of the God-Reason is life, and He himself is that actualization”, as well as that “His thinking (*noesis noesos*) is so powerful that it causes life-existence of the phenomenal Universe” (Kosiewicz 2006, p. 329).

Movement and time as qualities of the first matter exist in it in the realm of possibility, since the whole matter has potential qualities. They are activated by the form which contains reason, energy and aim defining the sequence and duration of transformations taking place one after another, as well as their definite end. The form of forms – that is, the First Cause and simultaneously the First Mover – brings about coming into being of the world (that is, of nature) and appearance of eternal movement in it. Time may in that case come into existence because of two reasons. Either it is included and dissolved in the abstract, non-sensual first matter and becomes active together with movement, or its coming into existence and lasting is stimulated by the First Mover.

Both in the first and in the second case time as abstraction concerns that what is quantitative and qualitative, sensually perceptible beings, the whole nature. Both it and human subjects – also continuously active – remaining in constant motion and aware of its lasting – are inevitably and necessarily influenced by it.

But time – as it is written by Aristotle – in spite of the fact that it concerns the sensual world, is something metaphysically perfect. “That is called “perfect” [complete] which has not even the smallest of its parts to be found outside of it; for example, the time of every thing is perfect [complete] when there are no other time being its proper part to be found outside of it” (Arystoteles 1988, p. 134).

Thus, time – regardless the conception of its origin – is a being in itself. It is neither the attribute of the first matter – although it emerges from it and become active thanks to God

– nor a property of the cosmos, although entities-subjects notice it and refer subjectively to it. It exists for itself, although it is not and cannot be constituted by itself.

Summary

In the above considerations I referred to a subjective and simultaneously universal and abstract conception of time based on combining assumptions of transcendental aesthetics, which characterize time and are included in Kant's critique of theoretical reason, with Heidegger's ontology. I pointed also out that Heidegger's views and his philosophy of time are rooted first of all in the philosophy of Greek antiquity. It refers especially to the metaphysical pre-being – indefinite abstract matter – and to activation of its sensual (according to Kant's terminology: "aesthetical") properties. Together with their appearance – either as a result of creativity of the the Arch-four, the Demiurge or the First Cause, or as a result of spontaneous causative power of the divine principium, or of autotelic activity of Heidegger's Being – properties of time become active. They exist always – as a perfect image of the eternal being, as an abstraction impossible to be defined – both when it saturates or exists independently or at the basis of the metaphysical world of all things as well as when it influences nature, the cosmos.

The views of the pointed out ancient philosophers consolidate the German thinker's philosophy of Being and time as the source-related and content-related context of justification, which – against its intentions – strengthens and lends credence to Kant's conception of self-related time. It takes place mainly thanks to the philosophical method applied in his considerations. Namely, both thinkers – Kant and Heidegger – used the intuitive method rejecting simultaneously the common-sense – met. for example, in Hegel's case – understanding of time. Kant considered time as clear subjective envisagement reaching that what has not been precisely defined by him and what is non-sensual and simultaneously super-individual and universal. Heidegger maintained also on the basis of philosophical intuition that that what is super-individual is, as a matter of fact, universal, since it has transcendental, non-subjective character. However, that what is transcendental can be not only thought (as in Kant's case), but also intuitively and subjectively perceived in a clearing of Being, which appears only in subjects and solely in people of unique poetic talent. Shortly speaking, the difference between two philosophers is in principle such that, according to Kant's opinion, every subject can intuitively perceive abstract time, whereas, according to Heidegger, every human being can thought time and encompass results of its influence with care, since he is a shepherd protecting the truth of Being and protecting and taking care of himself. Thus, he refers to time he has thought. Moreover – in extremely unique cases – he can perceive it in a clearing. That is why in Heidegger's case perception of time by the subject (at least before it comes to intuitive clearing) has – similarly as in Kant's case – a self-related character. Another epistemological step on the way to its intuitive perception is transcendental intuition justifying universal and abstract properties of time.

The above ontological and epistemological considerations on time lead to a conclusion that both conceptions of working time and of free time have definitions and justifications of a common-sense character, because it is pointed out in them that the man has time and he has it at his *free* disposal, whereas from the viewpoint of the above mentioned conceptions that is the man who is subjected to influences of time irrespective of his will. It happens so because according to the assumptions of the conception of occupied and non-occupied time, which have been presented in the first part of the text, the subject has never time at its disposal, because time colloquially called "its time" is always, as a matter of fact, occupied and the subject will never free itself from it – that is, from being subjected to time.

That is why time referred to entities, to the subject, can be treated neither as free, nor as non-free. But in spite of its full independence, which is transcendental in its relation to

entities and the subject, it constantly influences them. The man as the whole is saturated with, is occupied by time, since – regardless if he works or if he rests, if he sleeps or if he is aware – he cannot free himself of its influences, of changes connected with its influence. The man cannot free himself of time. That is why he cannot have free time. Free time would be time free of its influence.

Time according to Kant's and Heidegger's interpretation was introduced in order to make an attempt to grasp and explain a strictly subjective and necessary connection with it, in spite of the fact that it has simultaneously a metaphysical, super-individual and transcendental character, and in order to point out that it is an illusion that we can have it at our disposal in the colloquial sense. From the philosophical viewpoint we are always entangled in the connection with time – we, as organic beings, always are occupied by time. That is why there is no, and the man cannot also have, free time, since – regardless what he does: works, deals with anything else or even does nothing – he has always to do with occupied time. Colloquially speaking: free time does not exist. It concerns neither the subject's past, nor his future and present.

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